Recent Developments: Holmes v. State: Under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b), Prior Consistent Statements Offered to Rebut a Charge of Fabrication Must Precede the Motive to Fabricate by Cizek, Adam
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 29
Number 1 Fall 1998 Article 10
1998
Recent Developments: Holmes v. State: Under
Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b), Prior Consistent
Statements Offered to Rebut a Charge of
Fabrication Must Precede the Motive to Fabricate
Adam Cizek
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cizek, Adam (1998) "Recent Developments: Holmes v. State: Under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b), Prior Consistent Statements Offered
to Rebut a Charge of Fabrication Must Precede the Motive to Fabricate," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 29 : No. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol29/iss1/10
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that prior 
consistent statements which 
postdate an alleged fabrication, 
improper influence, or motive 
were inadmissible under Maryland 
Rule 5-802.1 (b). Holmes v. State, 
350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 
(1998). The court found, however, 
that prior consistent statements 
may be admissible to rehabilitate 
the witness under Maryland Rule 
5-616( c )(2) where the fact that the 
statement was made detracts from 
the impeachment. 
On June 20, 1995, Danise 
Harris ("Harris") and her 
roommate, Ellouise Thompson 
("Thompson"), met the defendant, 
Holmes, as well as Antoine 
Awkard, and Miah Lewis 
("Lewis"). Harris and Lewis 
separated from the group, and 
shortly thereafter, a shot was fired 
killing Harris. After the shooting, 
Thompson gave a written 
statement attesting that she did not 
see who shot Harris. Two days 
later, Thompson gave a second 
statement to police indicating that 
Holmes had murdered Harris. At 
trial, Thompson's testimony was 
consistent with her second 
statement. 
Thompson testified on direct 
examination that she originally 
was scared to implicate the 
defendant in the shooting and that 
her fears were compounded by a 
visit from the defendant the day 
after the shooting. On cross-
examination, Thompson's original 
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statement was admitted into 
evidence to impeach Thompson. 
On redirect, the trial court 
admitted Thompson's prior 
consistent statement over defense 
counsel's objection, and 
subsequently, the defendant was 
convicted and sentenced to thirty 
years imprisonment. The 
defendant appealed, arguing that 
the trial court erred by admitting 
Thompson's pnor consistent 
statement. 
On appeal, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
trial court's conviction of the 
defendant. The court ruled that 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (b) did not 
codify the common law 
requirement that prior consistent 
statements, admitted to rebut a 
charge of fabrication, must precede 
the motive to fabricate. Therefore, 
the court of special appeals held 
that Thompson's prior consistent 
statement was admissible under 
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Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b). The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the intermediate appellate 
court's ruling, but on different 
grounds. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by noting that a witness' 
prior consistent statement is 
generally not admissible to 
buttress the witness' credibility. 
Holmes, 350 at 416-17, 712 A.2d 
at 556. An exception to this rule 
occurs when the witness' 
credibility is attacked by "an 
implication of fabrication or 
improper influence or motive." Jd 
at 417, 712 A.2d at 556 (citing 
City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Knee, 83 Md. 
77, 79 (1896)). In such a situation, 
a witness' prior consistent 
statement is admissible if it 
precedes the alleged fabrication, or 
improper influence or motive to 
fabricate. Jd 
The court continued its 
analysis by examining Maryland 
Rule 5-802.l(b) and the parallel 
Federal Rule of Evidence, 
801 (d)(1)(b). Jd. at 418,712 A.2d 
at 556. Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) 
establishes that "[a] statement that 
is consistent with the declarant's 
testimony, if the statement is 
offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against the 
declarant of fabrication, or 
improper influence or motive," 
will not be excluded by the 
hearsay rule. Jd The court 
emphasized that neither rule 
addresses the timing of a prior 
consistent statement. Jd 
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Therefore, the court looked to the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Federal Rule 801 (d)(1)(b), from 
which Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) 
was derived. 
The court reviewed a United 
States Supreme Court decision that 
held that the federal rule codified 
the common law requirement that 
a prior consistent statement, 
admitted to rebut a charge of 
fabrication, must precede the 
alleged fabrication, improper 
influence, or motive. Id. at 418, 
712 A.2d at 557 (citing Tome v. 
United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 
(1995)). The Supreme Court 
announced that "'the forms of 
impeachment within the Rule's 
coverage are the ones in which the 
temporal requirement makes the 
most sense.'" Id. at 419, 712 A.2d 
at 557 (quoting Tome, 513 U.S. at 
158). The court of appeals 
reasoned that prior consistent 
statements which postdate an 
alleged fabrication or improper 
influence or motive carry little 
weight. Id. Therefore, the court 
concluded that prior ccnsistent 
statements which do not precede 
an alleged fabrication, improper 
influence, or motive are 
inadmissible under Federal Rule 
801 (d)(1)(b). Id. at 418, 712 A.2d 
at 557 (citing Tome, 513 U.S. at 
167). 
Next the court of appeals 
examined the reasoning used by 
the court of special appeals that the 
omission of the word "recent" in 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) 
signified an intention to break 
from the federal rules and common 
law. Id. at 424, 712 A.2d at 559. 
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The court opined that Maryland 
Rule 5-802.1 (b) was ambiguous 
with respect to the timing of prior 
consistent statements. Id. at 423, 
712 A.2d at 559. Therefore, the 
court reviewed the legislative 
history of the rule to determine its 
intent, and the court found that 
Maryland omitted the word 
"recent" because its use was 
inaccurate. Id. Under Maryland 
Rule 5-802.1 the alleged 
fabrication need not be newly 
created. Id. Thus, Maryland 
omitted the word "recent." Id. 
Furthermore, the court found that 
the rule based admissibility of 
prior consistent statements on 
relevance. Id. (citing Reporter's 
Note to the Rules Comm., 125th 
Report, regarding Rule 5-802.1, 
July 1993, at 188). Generally 
speaking, the court determined that 
prior consistent statements which 
do not precede the motive to 
fabricate are irrelevant to rebut a 
charge of fabrication. Id. 
Therefore, the court of appeals 
concluded that in order for a prior 
consistent statement to be 
admissible under Maryland Rule 
5-802.1 (b), it must precede the 
alleged fabrication, improper 
influence, or motive. Id. at 424, 
712 A.2d at 559. 
The court then addressed the 
applicability of Maryland Rule 5-
802.1(b). Id. In order for 5-
802.1 (b) to apply, a prior 
consistent statement must be 
offered to rebut a charge of 
fabrication. Id. The court 
concluded that on redirect the State 
offered Thompson's prior 
consistent statement to rehabilitate 
Thompson's credibility, not to 
rebut a charge of fabrication. Id. at 
425, 712 A.2d at 560. Thus, the 
court held that Maryland Rule 5-
802.1 (b) was not applicable. Id. at 
425, 712 A.2d at 559. However, 
the court held that Maryland Rule 
5-616(c), which neither party had 
addressed, was applicable. Id. at 
428, 712 A.2d at 562. 
Under Maryland Rule 5-
616( c), a prior consisterit statement 
may be admitted to rehabilitate a 
witness when such a statement 
"detracts from the impeachment" 
of a witness. Id. at 427, 712 A.2d 
at 561. The court emphasized that 
when prior consistent statements 
are offered to rehabilitate the 
witness they are not hearsay 
because they are not offered for 
their substantive truth. Id. The 
statements are offered instead 
because the witness' credibility is 
increased as a result of the witness' 
prior statement. Id. In the instant 
case, the court concluded that 
Thompson's second statement to 
police detracted from the 
impeachment of her original 
statement, and was therefore 
admissible under Maryland Rule 
5-616(c). Id. at 428, 712 A.2d at 
562. 
In Holmes v. State, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland 
acknowledged an important 
loophole by which attorneys may 
have prior consistent statements 
admitted into evidence under 
Maryland Rule 5-616(c)(2). 
Although the prior consistent 
statements will not be admitted as 
substantive evidence, the practical 
effect on the jurors will be the 
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same. The use of prior consistent 
statements to bolster witness 
testimony and rehabilitate 
credibility will playa critical role 
in the ability of attorneys to sway 
Junes. 
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